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IVIICHAEL P. KEANE 
Any attempt to infer the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the 
productivity of domestic firms must first confront a number of severe 
econometric challenges. I believe these challenges are so great that the lit-
erature has barely begun to tackle them. In particular, the econometric 
specifications estimated in the current literature do not seem to be closely 
tied to any underlying economic theory that specifies the mechanisms 
through which productivity spillovers might operate. Given the severe 
econometric problems this literature must confront, I expect that progress 
will require econometric modeling based rather tightly on maintained eco-
nomic theory. Any inferences so obtained will then be dependent on strong 
a priori identifying assumptions regarding economic structure. 
Of course, this situation is not unique to identifying FDI spillover effects. 
We always need a priori identifying assumptions in order to learn anything 
of interest from data, beyond perhaps the simplest of descriptive statistics. 
Data cannot simply "speak" and answer our questions about interesting 
aspects of economic behavior without our bringing some a priori informa-
tion to bear.1 However, I think the need for more a priori structure if we are 
Michael P. Keane is professor of economics in the Department ofEconornics nt Yale University. 
1. By "data" I mean the joint dish·ibution of observed variables. To use the language of the 
Cowles Commission, 
Suppose ... [an econometrician] is faced with the problem of identifying ... the 
structural equations that alone reflect specified laws of economic behavior .. . . 
Statistical observation will in favorable circumstances permit him to estimate .. . 
the probability distribution of the variables. Under no circumstances whatever 
will passive statistical observation permit him to distinguish between different 
----·-·---- - ____ _____ , __ . - -
r 
to make any progress in estimating FDI spillover effects is particularly 
striking. 
For the most part, the eYisting literature on FDI spillovers takes the 
approach of estimating production funci.ions in which the total factor pro-
ductivity (TIP) of the domestic firms in a particular industry I country is 
allowed to be a function of some measure of the FDI directed by multinational 
corporations (I\!1NCs) into that industry.2 For instance, the market share of 
foreign-owned :i\!INC affiliates in the industry, or the average foreign equity 
participation across all firms in an industry, are commonly used FDI mea-
sures. To fi'< ideas, consider a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
Yit = A, K~ I!;, 
where y;1 is output (or value added) of firm i at time t, A;1 is TFP, and Kit 
and Lit are the capital and labor inputs, respectively. Letting TFP be deter-
mined by 
ln Ail = reo + rclFi, + 'll i + <jl, + £,, 
where Fit is the measure of foreign presence in the industry j to which firm i 
belongs, TJi is an industry-specific effect, <jl; is a firm-specific effect, and £;1 is a 
firm- I time-specific idiosyncratic productivity shock, we obtain the equation: 
lny,, = rc 0 + rc1Fi, + alnK;, +~In Lit + 'lli + <jl , +£it (I.l) 
The basic approach is to estimate an equation like 1.1 and to view a signif-
icant positive estimate of the coefficient n1 on the FDI variable as evidence 
of spillovers. 
Now, some of the key difficulties in estimating the parameters of equa-
tion 1.1 are common to the literature on estimating production functions 
in general and are not specific to estimating FDI spillover effects. Good dis-
cussions of these problems can be found in Marschak and Andrews (1944), 
Griliches and Mairesse (1995), and Klette and Griliches (1996). 
The most obvious problem is endogeneity of the capital and labor inputs, 
since these will generally be chosen in response to productivity as deter-
mathematically equivalent ways of writing down that distribution .. .. The only 
way in which he can hope to identify and measure individual structural equations ... 
is with the help of a priori specifications of the form of each structural equation 
(Koopmans, Rubin, and Leipnik 1950). 
2. Some studies also examine "backward linkages" by including measures of FDI in indus-
tries that are supplied by the industry in question. 
mined by TJi + <jl; + £it. The standard solutions to this problem are some com-
bination of (i) differencing the data to eliminate the time-invariant compo-
nents of productivity and / or (ii) finding instruments that are assumed to be 
correlated with factor input choices but uncorrelated with productivity 
(such as input prices). We can then estimate equation I.1 using instrumen-
tal variables (IV) to deal with the endogeneity of the factor inputs. 
Instruments that might typically be used for the capital and labor inputs 
are measures of wage rates and the price of capital. A more recent alterna-
tive to (ii) is the Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure that uses investment as 
an indicator of the productivity shock. 
A major problem with this general approach is the failure to deal seriously 
with heterogeneity in firms' production processes. As Lipsey and Sjoholrn 
cogently point out in chapter 2 of this volume, it seems unlikely that we can 
make sense of FDI spillovers in a modeling framework where all they do is 
shift TFP. If knowledge spillovers occur, it seems likely that FDI will alter the 
production functions of domestic firms in much more subtle and extensive 
ways. For example, perhaps a knowledge spillover will lead to a more capi-
tal-intensive production process or enable a reorganization of the domestic 
firm so that it can take advantage of economies of scale. In such cases, 
spillovers will affect the share parameters ill equation 1.1, not just TFP. This 
highlights the point that no specific theory of how knowledge spillovers affect 
production technology underlies specifications as in equation I. l . 
Furthermore, a striking aspect of equation 1.1 is the assumption of fixed 
technology parameters even across industries. Yet, if we look at manufactur-
ing industries where FDI occurs, there is ample evidence of substantial 
heterogeneity in firms' technologies even when we look at firms within 
narrowly defined industries. Evidence is provided in a series of studies by 
Feinberg and Keane (2001, 2003a, 2003b ), Feinberg, Keane, and Bognanno 
(1998), and the chapter by Feinberg and Keane in this volume. In these stud-
ies, we find that :i\!INC affiliates operate in very different ways even within 
narrowly defined industries: the shares of capital, labor, materials, and inter-
mediates imported from parents differ quite substantially across firms. 
This suggests three problems: First, if technological heterogeneity is preva-
lent for affiliates, it is likely to be prevalent for domestic firms as well. If share 
parameters are heterogeneous across firms / industries (i.e., some firms use 
more capital-intensive production processes than others), then an instru-
mental variables technique applied to equation 1.1, using supply-side 
instruments like wage rates and the price of capital, will not generally resolve 
the problem of endogeneity of the capital and labor inputs. We might think 
that with heterogeneous coefficients we would estimate the mean coefficient 
values in the population of firms, which would still be of interest. However, 
as I discuss in the appendix, this is true only under very special assump-
tions that we would not expect to hold in the present case. In general, with 
heterogeneity on the production function parameters, the IV approach will 
not consistently estimate behaviorally interpretable parameters.3 
Second, if the impact of FDI on TFP differs across firms I industries, and/ or 
FDI has more general impact on technology than just shifting TFP, then esti-
mation of specifications as in equation I.1 using instrumental variables pro-
cedures will not in general identify the parameter n11 and, furthermore, it is 
no longer even clear how a parameter like 1t1 could be interpreted. 
Third, Feinberg and Keane (chapter 10 in this volume) document thatl\1NC 
affiliates in developing countries are organized in very different ways. That 
is, if we look at affiliates within an industry I country, some are organized to 
use a substantial volume of imported intermediates from parents while oth-
ers are not, some are organized to ship substantial volumes of intermediates 
back to parents while others are not, some are organized to trade heavily 
with the parent's affiliates in other countries while others are not, and so 
on. The existing econometric literature takes no account of the possibility 
that the form of affiliate organization may play a key a role in whether and 
how knowledge is transferred to local firms. This again stems from the gen-
eral failure to base empirical work on specific underlying theories that 
specify the mechanisms through which knowledge transfer arises. 
· On this issue, the case study literature, such as Moran (2001), is quite 
informative, because it suggests that the nature of the interaction between 
parents and affiliates does heavily influence whether and how knowledge 
is transferred. As Moran (chapter 11 in this volume) notes "these investiga-
tions showed that there is a fundamental difference in performance between 
subsidiaries that are integrated into the global or regional sourcing net-
works of the parent multinationals, and subsidiaries that are oriented 
toward protected domestic markets ... . " 
Lipsey and Sjoholm (chapter 2 in this volume) argue that the case study lit-
erature addresses the question of whether there are examples where tech-
nology was transferred from l\1NCs to domestically owned firms, while the 
"statistical studies ask whether on average domestically owned firms gain 
... from the presence of foreign-owned firms." However, it is important to 
recognize that, when heterogeneous effects are present, an econometric 
analysis that assumes homogenous effects does not in general answer this 
"on average" question. In general, the biases induced by ignoring hetero-
3. Intuitively, the problem arises because, if production function coefficients differ across 
firms, then a model that assumes homogenous parameters will sweep the firm-specific part 
of the parameters, along with capital and labor input terms they multiply, into the error term. 
Also, with heterogeneous production function parameters, "exogenous" factor price changes 
will have different effects on factor inputs for different firms. Thus, changes in factor inputs 
induced by "exogenous" changes in the wage rate or price of capital are still correlated with 
the firm-specific parameters that enter the error term. The only way to deal with the problem 
is to model the heterogeneity explicitly. Although in a different context, Feinberg and Keane 
(2003a) is the only study I know of that does this. 
geneity are much more fundamental (see appendix IA). I would argue 
instead that the case study literature might be used to help guide the devel-
opment of theoretical models of the mechanisms through which knowledge 
iTansfers occur, and that these in turn might be used as the basis for struc-
tural economic analysis (see below). 
Another general problem in the estimation of production functions that 
I would like to point out is what I will call the "price times quantity (PQ) 
problem." This problem was stressed by Griliches and Mairesse (1995) and 
Klette and Griliches (1996), and is also discussed by Lipsey and Sjoholm (in 
this volume). The main problem is that we do not actually have data on real 
output quantities (or real value added) Yit for purposes of estimating equa-
tion I.l . Rather, we typically have data only on sales revenues, meaning 
we see only PQ and not quantity itself. 
In order to deal with the PQ problem, it has been typical in the literature 
on production function estimation to simply use industry-level price 
indices to deflate nominal sales revenue data so as to construct real output. 
But Griliches and Mairesse (1995) as well as Klette and Griliches (1996) 
have pointed out that this procedure is valid only in perfectly competitive 
industries, so that price is exogenous to firms . If firms have market power, 
then any change in inputs will shift both price and quantity, with the price 
effect depending both on the elastidty of demand facing the firm and the 
elasticity of output with respect to the input, both of which are, in general, 
firm specific. In the present context, the point is that, if FDI seems to shift rev-
enue, we do not know if this is because it shifted productivity or prices. 
These considerations are important here because we would expect FDI to 
occur in industries where firms do indeed have market power. The PQ 
problem has received a great deal of attention recently in the industrial-
organization (IO) literature (see, for example, Katayama, Lu, and Tybout 
2003 and Levinsohn and Melitz 2002). 
The only general solution to the problem of endogenous output prices is 
to estimate the production function jointly with an assumed demand sys-
tem. To my knowledge, the only study where such an approach has been 
fully implemented is Feinberg and Keane (2003a), which estimates the pro-
duction technology of US parents and their manufacturing affiliates in 
Canada.4 In the FDI spillover context, one would need to estimate the pro-
duction functions for domestic (i.e., host country) firms jointly with a 
demand system. 
In this regard, Lipsey and Sjoholm (in this volume) make the interesting 
point that "if the foreign investors' .. . superiority consists of knowledge 
about ... marketing a product .. . it will not be visible in ... production 
4. The solutions proposed by Katayama, Lu, and Tybout (2003) as w ell as Levinsohn and 
Melitz (2002) are somewhat more specialized and do not require complete specification of the 
demand system. 
function comparisons." Another way to put it is that FDI spillovers may 
operate by affecting the demand system rather than the production func-
tion. Given the PQ problem, this means they actually may show up in pro-
duction function comparisons, but not in any interpretable way. It is 
disconcerting that a knowledge spillover that enables firms to enhance 
market power could show up spuriously as a productivity enhancement, 
since the two have very different welfare implications. 
Next, I focus on an issue that is more specific to the literature on esti-
mating FDI spillover effects: FDI is likely to be endogenous. One key 
source of endogeneity is that I\IINCs may be attracted to invest in countries 
that have high productivity. A country's solid legal framework, low risk of 
appropriation (see Wang and Blomstrom 1992), and a relatively free/well-
managed economy could make it more attractive for FDI. All these factors 
would presumably lead to more productive domestic firms as well. An 
econometric study that failed to account for these factors might falsely con-
clude that FDI enhanced productivity, when in fact FDI was just attracted 
to countries that were pursuing productivity-enhancing policies. 
But there are other stories where the endogeneity bias can go either way. 
In the theoretical literature on FDI and spillovers (e.g., Ethier and Markusen 
1996 and Petit and Sanna-Randaccio 2000), one point that is stressed is that 
FDI is more likely when a country /industry has better protection of intel-
lectual property. This could lead us to see more FDI in industries/ countries 
where spillovers are smaller, leading to a negative correlation between host 
country productivity and I\IINC penetration. On the other hand, if intellec-
tual property protection is good for productivity-enhancing investment in 
general, or if it is associated with a country having a generally favorable eco-
nomic climate, then I\IINCs' tendency to invest in countries with strong 
intellectual property protection could lead to a spurious positive correlation 
between domestic firm productivity and FDI. 
Furthermore, a key point is that I\IINC entry into an industry will gener-
ally change the market structure, leading to either more or less competition 
depending on the entry and exit behavior of domestic firms. This in tum can 
lead to either an increase or decrease in research and development (R&D) 
activity by domestic firms (see Veuglers and Vanden Houte 1990). Also, if 
domestic firms have market power, they may engage in inefficient manage-
ment practices that are reformed when foreign competition is introduced. 
Thus, it is perfectly possible that FDI could affect productivity of domestic 
firms for reasons that have nothing to do with knowledge spillovers. 
Such endogeneity problems are the focus of Gordon Hanson's insightful 
comment in this volume. He argues that, given the endogeneity of FDI, we 
cannot really infer anything causal from the positive correlation between 
FDI and domestic firm productivity found in the literature. As Hanson dis-
cusses, one way we might try to address these endogeneity problems is to 
find instruments or "natural experiments" that generate exogenous changes 
in FDI. Such approaches are currently quite fashionable in applied eco-
nomics. However, I am not optimistic t.hat we can make much headway on 
estimating FDI spillover effects if we pursue this course. One basic prob-
lem is that truly exogenous factors driving FDI are hard to come by. 
The theoretical literature suggests that firms choose b etween FDI or 
exports as a means to serve a foreign market based on such factors as tar-
iffs, transport costs, wage rates, and other costs in the host country. Similar 
factors influence vertical FDI. But would a change in tariffs be exogenous 
with respect to FDI? It seems likely that tariff changes are associated with 
other changes in the economic environment- for example, cotmtries that 
lower tariffs often engage in a broad range of economic liberalizations at 
the same time. In order to conclude that any change in productivity asso-
ciated with a tariff-induced change in FDI was due solely to the change in 
FDI itself, we would have to control for all these other concomitant changes 
in the economic environment. 
Factors like restrictions on capital investment, intellectual property pro-
tection, expropriation risk, political stability, and economic freedom are pre-
sumably important determinants of FDI as well. The data also contain a 
great deal of variation along these dimensions. Indeed, Lipsey and Sjoholm 
(in this volume) point out that more than 1,500 policy changes mal<iri.g regu-
lations more favorable to FDI occurred during the 1991-2002 period, along 
with 100 changes making regulations less favorable. Do any 6f these regula-
tor changes provide "natural experiments?" I expect not, precisely because 
they are likely to be accompanied by other economic policy changes and 
institutional changes. 
Another problem with inferring causality from POI/productivity corre-
lations is the problem of reverse causality. FDI itself may lead to changes in 
regulations affecting FDI and also to changes in economic policy and/ or in 
political/ economic institutions. These policy changes might enhance pro-
ductivity, quite apart from any direct effects of FDI. Thus, it seems highly 
implausible to me that we can ever find natural experiments where FDI is 
made more or less attractive while holding all other things equal. 
Even if we could find a perfectly exogenous instrument that shifts FDI 
while not being associated with any other (unmeasured) changes in the eco-
nomic environment, we would still face a number of problems. First, if pro-
duction function heterogeneity exists; then the biases discussed earlier (and 
in the appendix) would prevent two-stage least squares (2SLS) from giving 
a consistent estimate of coefficient 1t1.5 Further, even if we could use such an 
5. The popularity of the fourth approach stems, in part, from the currently prevalent view that, 
if we can find "natural experiments" or "clever instruments," we can learn interesting thlngs 
about behavior without making strong a priori assumptions and without using "too much" 
economic theory. However, it is important to remember that the assumption that a variable 
is exogenous and a valid instrument always rests on a set of theoretical assumptions (see 
Marschak 1950). As Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) discuss, in the "natural experiment" 
approach, the theoretical (or behavioral) assumptions that underlie exogeneity assumptions 
instrument to estimate the causal effect of FDI on productivity, we would 
not have isolated the mechanism through which the productivity enhance-
ment occmred. Is it knowledge spillovers, or is it the response of domestic 
firms to enhanced competition, which, as we noted earlier, could lead to 
enhanced R&D or to adoption of more efficient management practices? 
All of this suggests that we are unlikely to make progress in estimating 
FDI spillover effects using the simple strategy of estimating production 
flmctions with instrumental. variables techniques. I believe that to make 
any progress we will need to model additional data beyond measmes of 
FDI, output, and factor inputs. The preceding discussion suggests it is 
important to also look at industry structme (entry and exit), measures of 
R&D spending, and, perhaps, to attempt to form more direct measmes of 
spillovers. Severe problems of endogeneity and reverse causality suggest 
that we should not attempt to model effects of FDI on productivity in a sin-
gle equation framework but, rather, view both variables as endogenous 
outcomes that are jointly determined, along with such factors as market 
structme and R&D, as part of a structural system. 
In this regard, I am struck by the fact that there are several parallel liter-
atmes to the FDI spillover literature that seem to simply reorganize what 
is on the left- and right-hand sides of the estimating equations. For instance, 
there is literatme that examines the determinants of FDI (see, for example, 
Brainard 1997 and Neven and Siotis 1996), where the determinants are 
things like R&D intensity, labor productivity, tariff and non tariff barriers, 
and legaJ and economic institutions. There is literature in growth theory 
that examines the effects of such factors as institutions, the legal environ-
ment, and corruption on economic growth and/ or productivity. Studies 
in this literature estimate equations like equation 1.1 except that now the 
FDI measure is replaced by measures of institutions (see, for example, 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). There is also both theoretical and 
empirical literature examining how FDI and market structure influence 
R&D spending (see, for example, Veuglers and Vanden Houte 1990 and 
Wang and Blomstrom 1992). Fmthermore, there is literatme in development 
that examines the effect of FDI and growth on institutions. 
Putting it all together, we have literatme that looks at the effect of FDI 
on productivity, literature that looks at the effect of productivity and insti-
tutions on FDI, literature that looks at the effect of institutions on produc-
tivity, literature that looks at how FDI and market structure affect R&D, 
are often quite strong, and they are often left implicit. The failure of wages and the price of 
capital to provide valid instrumental variables for the estimation of equation I.l, even if they 
are completely exogenous from individual firms' point of view, is a good illustration of the 
potential pitfalls that come from failing to explicitly record a structural model in order to 
examine whether an instrument is valid. As the appendix shows, wages and the price of cap-
ital are not valid instruments for estimation of this model unless a very stringent assumption 
on production function homogeneity is made. 
and literatme that looks at the effects of productivity and FDI on institu-
tions. Perhaps it would make more sense to model how productivity, FDI, 
R&D, market structme, and economic institutions evolve together in a 
dynamic process, rather than having separate literatmes that examine the 
determinants of each of these variables individually while treating all the 
others as exogenous. 
Development of a dynamic structmal model of FDI and productivity 
would obviously be a major 1.mdertaking, but one can see where it might 
have advantages. For instance, thinking about a dynamic model would 
immediately lead one to ask: Why should the contemporaneous value of FDI 
enter equation I.1? Knowledge transfer is presumably a gradual process, and 
there are costs to adopting new technologies (see Teece 1976 for a discus-
sion) . One would think that, if FDI does transfer knowledge, then it should 
raise productivity with a lag. These types of considerations may lead to 
timing restrictions that could aid identification. 
In summary, I have tried to highlight some of the severe econometric prob-
lems facing the literatme on FDI spillovers. Given these problems, it is very 
difficult to draw any reliable conclusions regarding causality from the exist-
ing econometric work in this area. I hope that by bringing additional theory 
and data to bear it will be possible to make further progress. In my view, the 
most mgently needed step is to stop treating the mapping from FDI to pro-
ductivity as a black box. Researchers should attempt to formulate realistic 
theoretical models of the mechanisms through which FDI might generate 
knowledge spillovers and attempt to bring these models to the data. 
Appendix IA 
If the share parameters a and ~in equation 1.1 differ across industries, then 
the capital and labor inputs enter the error term of the homogenous coeffi-
cients model.~That is, we can write: 
lnyit = rc 0 + rc 1Fi, + iilnKit +~In Lit 
+[a, In Kit+~' lnLit + Tl i + <j>, + £,, ] (IA.1) 
where we have let a; = a+ ai and ~i = ~ + ~il where a Clf}d ~ are the mean 
share parameters across all firms I indus tries, and fi; and ~ i are the firm i spe-
cific deviations from those means. 
Note that the error term, which appears in square brackets in equation 
IA.1, contains the capital and labor inputs multiplied by the firm-specific 
share parameters. To give a simple illustration of the problems this creates, 
suppose that all firms face isoelastic demand functions of the form: 
Pit = Pa;Y~g 
where 0 < g < 1, and further suppose that production is constant returns to 
scale (CRS), so that a;+ ~i = 1. In that case, the firm's optimal choice oflabor 
input is given by: 
1 In Lit = -{[1- a ,(1- g)]ln(1 - a;)+ a , (1- g) Ina, 
g 
+ ln(1- g)P0, + (1- g) lnAit - [1- a, (1- g)]lnwit 
+ a,(1-g)lnrcit } (IA.2) 
where w it is the wage rate facing firm i at timet, and nit is the rental price of 
capital. Let us assume that the log wage and price of capital are "exoge-
nous" in the sense that: 
E[a,/ln w,11 ln nit]= E [TJ i /ln wit,ln nit]= E[<J>dln wit,ln rc,,] 
= E[Eit/ lnwit ,lnrcit ] = 0 
so these variables would, at first sight, appear to be plausible instruments. 
Noting that in the CRS case we have ~i = (1- a)- ai, we see that the error 
term in IA.l can be written as: 
a, In Kit- a, In Lit+ TJi + <J>, +£it (IA.3) 
If we look at the term - fii ln Liv and plug in the equation IA.2 for ln Li1, we 
see that the resulting expression contains a term of the form: 
a, [1- a,(1 - g)] ln wit . 
Then, substituting in a; = a+ ai, we see that this expression, in tum, con-
tains a term of the form: 
(a;)\1- g) ln wit. 
This component of the error term in IA.1 is correlated with ln Wit unless the 
variance of fi; is zero (i.e., unless there is no heterogeneity in the share param-
eters across firms). 
This argument implies that, in estimating equation IA.1, the supply 
price of labor is not a valid instrument for the labor input, since it will be 
correlated with the error term IA.3. The same type of argument shows that 
the supply price of capital in not a valid instrument for the capital input. In 
fact, given how the capital and labor inputs enter the error term, there are 
no valid instruments by construction. Any variable that alters firms' 
choices of capital and labor inputs will be correlated with the error term. 
The only way to deal with this problem is to actually model the distribu-
tion of the firm-specific parameters and estimate this distribution.6 
Of course, there are conditions under which instrumental variables can 
be used to uncover the mean values of the coefficients in a random coeffi-
cients model. These conditions are discussed in Wooldridge (1997) and 
Card (1999, 1817-20). To understand why these conditions do not hold in 
the present case, it is useful to cast our mo~el into their framework. Let ~it 
denote the composite error term in equation IA.l. Wooldridge noted that, 
so long as 
E [~ ;./Zit ] = constant 
where Z it is the vector of instruments, then 2SLS applied to equation IIA.1, 
using Zit as the vector of instruments, will only lead to inconsistency in the 
estimate of the intercept. The slope coefficients of the model are still con-
sistently estimated. However, we have seen that ~it contains the term 
(a;)2 (1- g)ln wit 
and we therefore have that: 
E[(a;)\1- g)ln wit/In wit]= (1 - g)a~ ln wit. 
Thus, the expected value of ~it varies with the potential instrument ln wit· 
Intuitively, the real source of the problem is that the effect of the poten-
tial instrument (price oflabor) on the endogenous variable (the labor input) 
is heterogeneous across firms, as we can see in equation IA.2. In equation 
6. For an example, but in. a different context, see Feinberg and Keane (2003a). · 
IA.2, the common part of the effect of the wage on the labor input just 
derives from the [1- Ci(l- g)]ln wit term. This produces a component of ~it 
of the form <X;[l- a(l- g)]ln wit, and this term is mean zero conditional on 
ln wit. Thus, we see that it is the random part of the coefficient on ln wit in 
the labor demand function of equation IA.2 that creates the problem. 
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